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by
Prof. Dr. Harald A. Benink1
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus,
Geacht College van Decanen,
Distinguished Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is with honour and pleasure that I accept the appointment as Full Professor of
“Institutional  Design  of  Integrating  Markets”  at  the  Rotterdam  School  of
Management / Faculteit Bedrijfskunde of Erasmus University Rotterdam by giving
this  inaugural  address  entitled  “Financial  Regulation:  Emerging  from  the
Shadows”.
The topic of “Financial Regulation”, and in particular the regulation of the banking
industry,  is  frequently  discussed  nowadays  by  academics,  other  researchers,
bankers, and the bank regulators and supervisors themselves. During the past 20
years the banking sector in a large number of countries has experienced severe
crises,  usually  leading  to  substantial  financial  injections  by  the  national
governments. Examples include the serious problems with the savings and loan
associations and commercial banks in the U.S. in the 1980s, the severe banking
crisis in Japan (which started about 10 years ago and is still going on), the near-
collapse of the banking system in Norway, Sweden and Finland in the late 1980s,
and the crisis in Asia in the late 1990s.
1 The crucial question is why after a long
postwar period of stability banking problems became so widespread in the 1980s
and 1990s.
As argued by the International Monetary Fund in a number of studies (IMF 1992a,
1992b,  1993a,  1993b  and  2000),  before  the  financial  liberalization  and
deregulation of the 1980s cartelized banking markets, in concert with a host of
regulations, served to restrict competition in the financial services industry. Banks
and other financial institutions thus enjoyed a financial cushion in the form of
excess profits. Government-led deregulation and liberalization, with the related
market-driven financial innovation process, lowered barriers to new domestic and
foreign entrants, eliminated interest rate regulations, and weakened restrictions on
bank activities. Faced with a potential downsizing of their operations, many banks
responded to this new, less friendly environment by increasing the riskiness of
their portfolios.
                                                          
1 For an empirical study of the banking crises in the U.S. and the Nordic countries, see, e.g.,
Benink (1996).Financial Regulation:
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This  behavioral  response  of  increased  risk  taking  has  been  modelled  in  the
theoretical  literature,  focusing  on  incentives  and  the  moral  hazard  of  bank
stockholders.
2
The moral hazard view (see, e.g., Marcus 1984 and Keeley 1990) argues that
banks had increased incentives to take risk in the 1980s and 1990s for two main
reasons: losses that impaired capital and reduced charter values due to greater
competition.  Lower  capital  reduces  the  exposure  of  stockholders  and,  thereby,
their  concern  about  probable  losses  resulting  from  increased  risk  taking.  In
addition to tangible capital, firms have charter values, which may be defined as the
economic value deriving from the opportunity to do business in the future.
Keeley  (1990)  analyzes  under  a  fixed-rate  deposit  insurance  system  the
influence of increased competition on bank charter values, risk taking and capital
ratios. Following Merton (1977) he views deposit insurance as a put option on the
value of a bank’s assets at a strike price equal to the promised maturity value of its
debt. In the case of no banking regulation, banks seeking to maximize the value of
their equity will maximize the value of the put by increasing asset risk and/or
minimizing  invested  capital  relative  to  assets.  At  the  same  time,  however,
regulation limits competition which endowes banks with market power and makes
bank charters valuable. In this way the potential loss of a charter in the event of
bankruptcy can counterbalance the incentive for excessive risk taking due to fixed-
rate deposit insurance. Deregulation changes the subtle balance between these two
effects.  Because  deregulation  increases  competition,  bank  charter  values  will
decline and, consequently, banks reach earlier the point that increased risk taking
becomes attractive: the expected gain to bank stockholders of the enhanced value
of the deposit insurance put option exceeds the expected loss of the charter value.
Keeley’s argument starts from the assumption of a fixed-rate (including a zero-
rate) deposit insurance, which implies that increased risk taking does not lead to
higher deposit insurance premiums that banks have to pay to the deposit insurance
fund.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has responded to the banking crises
and the moral hazard effects by adopting new capital standards for banks in 1988
and, expectedly, in 2001. In the next paragraph we will discuss these efforts.   
                                                          
2 Key referenecs are Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Freixas and Rochet (1997), and Goodhart et
al. (1998).Emerging from the Shadows
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THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
In this paragraph, which is based on Benink and Wihlborg (2001), we discuss the
proposed New Basel Capital Accord. In January 2001 the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision proposed a new capital adequacy framework to respond to
deficiencies  in  the  1988  Capital  Accord  on  credit  risk.  In  particular  the  risk
classification determining capital requirements in the 1988 Accord was too broad
making it possible for banks to shift assets to relatively high-risk categories. In the
words of the Basel Committee when presenting an earlier version of the proposal
in June 1999:
The  current  risk  weighting  of  asset  results,  at  best,  in  a  crude  measure  of
economic  risk,  primarily  because  degrees  of  credit  risk  exposure  are  not
sufficiently calibrated as to adequately differentiate between borrowers’ differing
default risks. Another related and increasing problem with the existing Accord is
the ability of banks to arbitrage their regulatory capital requirement and exploit
differences  between  true  economic  risk  and  risk  measured  under  the  Accord.
Regulatory  capital  arbitrage  can  occur  in  several  ways,  for  example,  through
some  forms  of  securitization,  and  can  lead  to  a  shift  in  banks’  portfolio
concentrations to lower quality assets.
The January 2001 proposal is intended to replace the existing system of credit risk
weightings  by  a  system  that  will  either  use  external  rating  agencies’  credit
assessments for determining risk weights (the so-called “standardized” approach)
or use, for sophisticated and/or internationally active banks, the internal credit risk
assessments  by  banks  themselves  (the  so-called  “foundation”  and  “advanced”
approaches).  Given  the  opinions  expressed  by  the  international  banking
community, internal rather than external ratings will be the preferred option for
determining regulatory capital requirements of large banks. In this paragraph we
will discuss the likely incentive effects of the internal ratings-based approach.
Incentive effects of internal ratings
An important factor in judging the new Basel proposal is the incentive effects of
the  proposed  regulations.  As  phrased  in  a  March  2000  statement  of  the  U.S.
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee:
Sound  policy  requires  the  right  blend  of  regulation,  supervision,  and  market
discipline to provide the proper incentives for banks to avoid excessive risks and
to protect taxpayers, who ultimately stand behind the government funds that insure
the deposits of those institutions.Financial Regulation:
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The  proposed  regulations  would  have  a  positive  incentive  effect  in  terms  of
stimulating  banks  to  improve  their  internal  risk  management  systems:  only
sophisticated and/or internationally active banks could use their internal ratings
systems as the basis for determining the amount of capital that is required by the
supervisors.  Risk  weightings  based  on  the  internal  ratings  are  more  refined
compared to the 1988 Capital Accord. However, the approach is still additive, i.e.
summing up individual risks, since credit risk portfolio models using correlations
between  price  movements  of  individual  assets  are  not  yet  advanced  enough.
Consequently, the incentives and scope for regulatory capital arbitrage remain,
although to a lesser extent.
Another, and potentially perverse, incentive effect of the current proposals is
that  banks  might  have  incentives  to  design  internal  ratings  systems  that
systematically  underestimate  the  credit  risk  and,  hence,  lower  the  regulatory
capital  requirement,  deliberately  (i.e.  consciously)  or  non-deliberately  (i.e.
unconsciously).  A  deliberate  underestimation  occurs  when  banks  decide  to
manipulate the internal ratings systems, i.e. they are aware that the credit risk
ratings  they  present to  the  supervisory  authorities are  lower than  the  true  risk
profiles. A non-deliberate underestimation of the credit risk occurs when banks are
too  optimistic about  the  quality  of their loan  portfolio,  because  they  have  not
developed sufficient expertise in risk evaluation. Recent banking problems and
crises  in  more  than  90  countries  since  the  early  1980s  suggest  that  such  an
underestimation is conceivable.
Underestimation  of  credit risk  is  very  difficult  to  prove  due  to  the  lack  of
sufficient data and the length of the economic cycle. Even if it is possible to prove
for  a  supervisor  that  an  individual  bank  faces  severe  problems  because  of
underestimation of credit risk, it is very hard to design credible penalty systems,
because the penalties are likely to lead to the bankruptcy of the bank that is to be
penalized.  Moreover,  supervisors  are  facing  an  unequal  battle  with  the  banks.
Since  banks  might  have  strong  incentives  to  design  internal  ratings  systems
generating a lower capital requirement, they will be willing to hire the best people
and pay the highest salaries.
Deliberate underestimation of credit risk is even more likely to occur in some
banking  markets  where  supervision  is  weak  or  “captured”.  In  such  markets
favorably treated banks would be able to charge a lower spread on their loans. The
efforts  of  the  IMF  to  establish  rules  of conduct for supervisory  authorities,  to
provide training,  and  to  publish  evaluations  of  national  supervisory  authorities
could play a valuable role in reducing the scope for favored treatment of banks.
However, serious doubt remains whether supervisory authorities around the world
are  able  and/or  willing  to  detect  and  correct  those  banks  presenting  an
overoptimistic credit risk profile based on their internal ratings.
Summarizing,  the  argument  is  that  banks  might  have  strong  incentives  to  be
overoptimistic  when  designing  their  internal  ratings  systems.  Supervisors  haveEmerging from the Shadows
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limited resources to counterbalance this behavior. The task of the supervisor is
further complicated by the fact that there appears to be no international agreement
about  the  actual  design  of  internal  ratings  systems.  Indeed,  it  was  the  Basel
Committee itself that published in January 2000 an extensive study on the wide
range  of  practice  in  internal  ratings  systems  of  banks  around  the  world.  The
consequence is an unlevel playing field between internationally active banks: a
loan to company X might face different internal risk assessments by various banks,
leading to diverging regulatory capital requirements and, hence, differences in the
risk  premiums  charged  by  various  banks.  Ironically,  the  1988  Capital  Accord
provides more of a level playing field: all banks making a loan to company X face
a capital requirement of 8%. What is needed as a mechanism for preventing the
creation of an unlevel playing field is real market discipline.
Real market discipline
Market discipline can mitigate the potential underestimation of credit risk but the
Basel  Committee  proposal  does  not  provide  a  mechanism  for  such  discipline.
Although  the  proposal  contains  a  “pillar  3”  on  market  discipline,  information
disclosure and transparency, the approach is not sufficient. Information disclosure
and transparency will only generate real market discipline if there is a group of
investors  having  maximum  incentives  to  use  this  information.  Professional
investors  holding  a  bank’s  subordinated  debt  will  have  strong  incentives  to
evaluate  the  overall  riskiness  of  the  bank.
3  Interestingly,  many  large  and
internationally active banks do already issue substantial amounts of subordinated
debt, e.g. recent calculations published in March 2000 by the Federal Reserve
Board indicate a level of higher than 2% of total assets for such banks in the U.S.
Also, many large European banks have substantial amounts of subordinated debt.
The  Basel  Committee  could  implement  rather  easily  a  first  phase  of  the
subordinated  debt  proposal  by  (1)  introducing  a  mandatory  subordinated
requirement  as  part  of  the  regulatory  capital  requirement  where  the  minimum
percentage of subordinated debt to be issued is set in line with current levels of
subordinated debt, (2) signalling strongly and  ensuring  international  agreement
that subordinated debt is credibly uninsured, i.e. even in case of a bail-out the
holders of this debt will not be compensated for losses, and (3) monitoring closely
the  risk  premium  on  subordinated  debt  of  each  individual  bank,  establishing
whether  the  market’s  perception  of  increased  riskiness  is  shared  by  a  bank’s
                                                          
3 The idea of using subordinated debt as an instrument of disciplining banks goes back to the
1980s, in particular to proposals made in the U.S. by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(1983)  and  by  Benston,  Eisenbeis,  Horvitz,  Kane  and  Kaufman  (1986).  Recently,  a  rapidly
growing literature is emerging, such as Federal Reserve Board (1999 and 2000), Federal Reserve
Board and Department of  the  Treasury  (2000),  Calomiris  (1999),  Evanoff  and  Wall  (2001),
Sironi (2000a and 2000b), and Benink and Benston (2001).Financial Regulation:
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internal ratings system, and integrating this information in the supervisory review
process (“pillar II” of the Basel Committee proposal).
In the first phase of the subordinated debt proposal there would not yet be a
system of automatic sanctions (such as prompt corrective action) when the risk
premium goes up for a longer period of time. However, as part of the supervisory
review process a supervisor might decide to increase the capital requirement of a
particular  bank.  Since  banks  know  that  their  supervisor  is  watching  the  yield
spread on subordinated debt and might act on it, this will mitigate their incentives
to underestimate the credit risk.
Conclusion
Although the recent Basel Committee proposal is an important improvement in
terms of risk assessment and providing banks with incentives to improve their risk
management systems, it also contains potentially perverse incentive  effects for
banks to underestimate the credit risk. What is needed is supplementing the current
proposal  by  real  market  discipline  in  the  form  of  mandatory  and  credibly
uninsured subordinated debt. Through such a mechanism the perverse incentive
effects are mitigated, reducing the risk of an unlevel playing field.
The preceding recommendations on subordinated debt have been made several
times during the past few years by the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees
from Europe, Japan, Latin America, and the U.S.
4 In the next paragraph we will
elaborate on the work of these Shadow Committees.
                                                          
4 See, in particular, Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees from Europe, Japan, and the U.S.
(1999),  European  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Committee  (2000),  U.S.  Shadow  Financial
Regulatory  Committee  (2000  and  2001),  and  Latin-American  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory
Committee (2001).Emerging from the Shadows
7
SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITTEES
Inspired  by  the  example  of  the  U.S.  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Committee
(SFRC), similar Shadow Committees were  set  up  in  Europe, Japan, and  Latin
America during the period 1998-2001. All four Shadow Committees consist of
academics and other independent experts. At their regular meetings, they develop
recommendations regarding fundamental issues and approaches, as well as topics
of current interest, in the fields of banking and financial market regulation and
supervision. Through their work, the Committees try to “shadow” the work of the
relevant national or, as the case may be, supranational regulatory and supervisory
authorities. That is, they observe, examine and critically assess the evolution and
implementation of the strategies and policies of the regulatory and supervisory
authorities.
In this paragraph, which is based on Benink and Schmidt (2000), we discuss the
work of the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC). The
Committee’s  work  starts  from  the  assumption  that  scrutiny  and  critical,  but
constructive comments by independent researchers working in relevant fields can
make a positive contribution to the quality of the ongoing discourse in Europe
regarding  banking  and  financial  regulation,  to  the  quality  of  regulatory  and
supervisory  policies  and  practices,  and  ultimately  also  to  the  stability  and
efficiency of national and supranational financial systems.
Origin and composition of the ESFRC
The  idea  to  set  up  a  European  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Committee  was
strongly promoted by George Kaufman, co-chairman, and one of the initiators and
most prominent spokesmen of the U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee.
In terms of basic objectives and procedures the ESFRC follows the model of the
U.S. SFRC quite closely. This has proven to be a great advantage, as it has meant
that the ESFRC has not had to spend much time on discussions regarding these
issues.
The ESFRC was founded at a meeting in Brussels in March 1998. The initial
members  were  selected  on the basis  of  a  vaguely  defined, but  decidedly  non-
political criterion: a large number of European countries were targeted, and in each
country  one  or  two  academics  were  approached  who  could  be  assumed  to  be
experts  in  the  field  of  financial  regulation,  and  would  presumably  also  be
interested in taking part in a co-operative international effort over an extendedFinancial Regulation:
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period of time. Currently, the ESFRC has 13 active members from 11 countries.
5
The range of countries which are represented is not confined to the EU, and it is
most certainly not limited to the euro zone. One member is from Switzerland, and
one is an American who, however, studied in the UK and has done research there
for many years.
Another factor in the selection of members, besides ensuring the representation
of  a  sufficiently  broad  range  of  countries,  was  the  idea  that  each  individual
member should be in a position to contribute competence in a specific field such
as monetary economics, financial economics or derivatives in addition to his or her
knowledge of banking regulation and supervision. One member was on the board
of a major international bank before becoming a university professor. While the
majority of the members are economists, some are legal scholars who specialise in
banking and financial market law. Thus, in terms of both the nationalities and the
areas  of  professional  specialisation  that  are  represented,  the  members  of  the
ESFRC are a heterogeneous group. They hold positions at universities, research
institutes and think tanks. However, if a member worked in the financial sector,
were  a  member  of  a  legislative  body,  or  were  employed  by  a  regulatory  or
supervisory agency, this would be seen as compromising the independence of the
ESFRC, which forms the basis of its credibility.
At least from a European perspective, it appears that the U.S. SFRC advocates
a very specific point of view regarding regulatory issues. Its statements very often
embody a radically “liberal” position – in the sense of the word as it is generally
used  outside  the  U.S.  –  which  implies  a  deep-seated  scepticism  concerning
government-imposed regulation, and indeed concerning government intervention
in  the  economy  in  general.  Given  the  way  the  European  Shadow  Financial
Regulatory  Committee came  into  existence,  it  is  appropriate to ask  whether  it
shares  the  orientation  of  its  U.S.  counterpart,  and  if  it  does  not,  whether  its
members have some other common “regulatory philosophy”. The answer to both
parts  of  this  question  is  clearly  “No”.  Even  though  many  individual  ESFRC
members have studied or been a (visiting) professor in one of the Anglo-Saxon
countries for an extended period of time, and have certainly also been strongly
influenced by this experience, the ESFRC has not adopted the fundamental point
of view of the U.S. Committee. However, in terms of the fundamental approach to
regulatory  and  supervisory  issues,  the  various  statements  have  a  great  deal  in
                                                          
5 The  members  are:  Harald  Benink  (chairman),  Erasmus  University,  Rotterdam;  Christian  de
Boissieu,  University  of  Paris  I  (Sorbonne);  Franco  Bruni,  Bocconi  University,  Milan;  Jordi
Canals, IESE, Barcelona; Richard Dale, University of Southampton; Hans Geiger, University of
Zurich; Friedrich Kübler,  Johann  Wolfgang  Goethe  University,  Frankfurt/Main,  and  Clifford
Chance; Karel Lannoo, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; Rosa Lastra, University of
London; Reinhard H. Schmidt, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main; Benn Steil,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York; Niels Thygesen, University of Copenhagen; and Clas
Wihlborg, Copenhagen Business School and Gothenburg University.Emerging from the Shadows
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common. In almost all ESFRC statements problems of financial regulation and
supervision are viewed and discussed as incentive problems; and in each case the
recommendations  are  intended  primarily  to  bring  a  specific  incentive  problem
more  clearly  into  focus  and  to  devise  better,  i.e.  more  incentive-compatible,
solutions to the problem.
Objectives of the ESFRC
The ESFRC has defined three roles for itself: to observe, and comment critically
upon,  current  regulatory  policy  and  practice;  to  serve  as  a  bridge  between
academia and “the real world”; and to provide a European forum for the discussion
of regulatory and supervisory issues. The first of these three functions is the most
important one. This “shadow function” does not imply an adversarial attitude, but
it does oblige the ESFRC to maintain a certain distance between itself and the
agencies whose activities it seeks to evaluate. However, while it is essential to
maintain the critical distance required for objectivity, the Committee must at the
same  time  make  a  sufficient  effort  to  appreciate  the  problems  which  must  be
addressed  by  those  who  make  regulatory  and  supervisory  policy,  and  the
constraints faced by financial regulators at the level of  policy  implementation.
Under  no  circumstances  should  the  Committee  engage  in  gratuitous  or  glib
criticism of regulators or adopt a patronizing attitude towards them.
At least in comparison to the situation in the United States, the exchange of
information and ideas in Europe between practitioners in the field of financial
regulation and supervision and researchers in relevant fields was very limited in
scope until quite recently. At the same time, the financial sector and regulatory
challenges  and  practices  have  changed  dramatically,  as  have  the  views  of
academics on regulatory and supervisory issues. An exchange of ideas between
academics and practitioners can help to identify regulatory problems that call for
innovative solutions and highlight effective ways of addressing them. What does
this imply for the tasks which the ESFRC has set for itself?
There  are,  of  course,  many  academics  who  prefer  to  remain  in  their  ivory
towers instead of making the results of recent academic research −  which is often
quite  sophisticated  in  terms  of  the  theories  and  methodologies  it  employs  −
accessible to politicians and practitioners. This usually involves “advertising” the
importance and relevance of these results, and thus the possibility that they will be
criticized as erroneous, irrelevant or impossible to apply in practice. However, the
ESFRC feels that its job is to do precisely this, i.e. to attempt to derive strategies
for practical action from academic theories and at the same time to test those
theories with respect to their relevance and practicability.Financial Regulation:
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Issuing statements aimed at politicians, policymakers and practitioners with the
expectation that they will be taken seriously is indeed a way of testing the theories
which underlie the statements. Although a given statement might be well founded
from a purely academic point of view, its authors will be forced to conclude that it
was not as sound as they thought it was if it turns out that those to whom it was
primarily  addressed,  i.e.  the  relevant  group  of  practitioners,  reject  it  as
inappropriate or useless. A consistently negative reaction to the statements of a
shadow committee would not only undermine the credibility of this committee, but
would  also  make  the  relevant  group  of  policymakers  generally  less  willing  to
accept advice from the academic community.
The ESFRC is aware of how important it is to avoid this outcome. This it why
it endeavours to take the problems faced by practitioners seriously. And if it is
clear to them that the Committee understands their problems and realises how
difficult it is to solve these problems in the real world, then this means that the first
section of the bridge between academics and practitioners has already been built.
Important  insights  produced  by  advances  in  economic  theory,  such  as  the
recognition that explicit and implicit guarantees for financial institutions serve to
increase risk, or the insight that adherence to the “principle” that some banks are
too big to fail has adverse consequences, will only be accepted – and will only
begin to shape regulatory policy and practice – if a serious effort is made to show
how they can be implemented in the real world.
Emerging from the shadows…
It  is  clear  that  the  Shadow  Committees  have  positioned  themselves  “in  the
shadow” due to their self-imposed mission to “shadow” the official regulators and
supervisors  of  financial  institutions  and  markets.  However,  by  trying  to  make
practically-oriented  recommendations,  which  are  based  on  the  insights  of
advanced academic literature but can also be implemented in the real world, the
Shadow Committees try to emerge from their self-created shadows.
At the same time it is clear that policymakers still tend not to pay sufficient
attention  to  insights  provided  by  modern  economic  theory  on  issues  such  as
incentives, moral hazard, and the potential benefits of enhancing market discipline.
As  noted  before,  the  January  2001  Basel  Committee  proposal  provides  an
interesting  illustration  of  this  point.  Because  of  this  limited  use  of  insights
provided by modern academic literature, official regulators and supervisors are
putting  themselves  “in  the  shadow”.  A  more  systematic  and  consistent
implementation of concepts of modern economics could help them to emerge from
their own shadows.Emerging from the Shadows
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NEO-AUSTRIAN THEORY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
Market discipline of financial institutions, such as implied by the subordinated
debt proposal, is usually thought to be conceivable only if financial asset prices are
informationally efficient. Given empirical evidence of frequent inefficiencies on
financial markets, the question could arise whether, for instance, risk premiums on
subordinated debt could still be used in the supervisory process of determining
regulatory capital requirements.
In a paper published in The Journal of  Finance  of June  2001,  Benink  and
Bossaerts  present  a  Neo-Austrian  theory  of  financial  market  processes,  which
considers the market to be continuously evolving from one inefficiency to another,
never attaining the perfect, efficient equilibrium, yet strongly attracted towards it.
The  implication  of  such  a  view  is  that,  notwithstanding  the  possibility  that
financial markets might be inefficient, financial asset prices can still be used as a
reliable indicator.
An alternative view
The  neoclassical  rational  expectations  view  of  financial  markets  is  one  of
continuous  equilibrium  with  informationally  efficient  prices.  Empiricists  have
recently  questioned  the  validity  of  this  model,  pointing  to  evidence  of
inefficiencies. Alternative views have been presented to better match the empirical
evidence. One of these considers the market to be continuously evolving from one
inefficiency  to  another,  never  attaining  the  perfect,  efficient  equilibrium,  yet
strongly  attracted  towards  it.  Creative  investors  track  and  exploit  profit
opportunities generated by continuous shocks in a never-ending cycle. The result
would be a stable process with pronounced regularities.
Such  a  view  follows  from  the  Neo-Austrian  theory  of  market  processes,  a
recent rereading of the ideas of Friedrich Hayek (see, e.g., Hayek 1937, 1945,
1948, 1978, Littlechild 1982, Rizzo 1990, and Kirzner 1997). According to Neo-
Austrian theory, a competitive market provides a systematic set of forces, put in
motion by entrepreneurial alertness (i.e., eagerness to make money), which tend to
reduce  the  extent  of  ignorance  among  market  participants.  The  resulting
knowledge is not perfect; neither is ignorance necessarily invincible. Equilibrium
(read: market efficiency) is never attained, yet the market does exhibit powerful
tendencies towards it. The fact that equilibrium is never attained is attributed to an
erratically changing world where traders realize that their knowledge is imperfect.
At the same time, the changes are never so extreme as to frustrate the emergence
of powerful and pervasive economic regularities.Financial Regulation:
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For the reader who is not familiar with Neo-Austrian thinking, let us be more
specific. According to Hayek, the problem of economic choice and ultimately the
analysis of economic behavior in neoclassical theory is oversimplified, because it
has been reduced to optimal behavior under constraints that agents are supposed to
be very familiar with. These constraints concern (1) preferences, (2) production
and  market  technology,  and  (3)  resources.  In  contrast,  the  Neo-Austrian  view
stresses  that  fundamental  uncertainty  and  ignorance  exist  regarding  these
constraints. This uncertainty and ignorance is claimed to lead to disequilibrium,
and disequilibrium itself generates further uncertainty and ignorance regarding the
constraints. Disequilibrium thereby becomes self-enforcing and permanent.
However, alert participants in the market process, whom the Neo-Austrians
define as “entrepreneurs”, do try to get a  (necessarily incomplete) picture of the
nature of the disequilibrium in the marketplace, because disequilibrium generates
profit opportunities. The actions of these entrepreneurs produce the very signals
that are needed to reduce disequilibrium. However, due to continuous change in
the constraints, equilibrium is never achieved.
The  Neo-Austrian  view  lacks  the  mathematical  rigor  that  has  become
characteristic  of  neoclassical  economics.  Certainly  when  applied  to  financial
markets,  the  Neo-Austrian  approach  seems  to  be  vague  at  first.  Our  analysis
should be viewed as an attempt to come to an understanding of it in the standard
probabilistic language of finance. Some may disagree with our translation. In that
case, the reader should consider our analysis as providing an alternative view of
the  operation  of  financial  markets,  inspired  by,  but  not  necessarily  adequately
reflecting,  Neo-Austrian  economic  thinking.  As  will  be  discussed  shortly,  the
analysis  carries  a  distinct  message  about  the  empirical  analysis  of  inefficient
financial markets, independent of its goal to translate Neo-Austrian theory into
standard financial language.
Stationarity and inefficiencies
The most intriguing aspect of Neo-Austrian financial economics is its insistence
on  regularities,  that  is,  on  order,  while  at  the  same  time  rejecting  market
efficiency. We take the position that order must be translated into the probabilistic
concept of stationarity. Loosely speaking, this means that once an event occurs, it
is certain to recur at one point in the future, even if that point is unpredictable.
Such events are regularities. But, if our translation of order into the notion of
stationarity is correct, the Neo-Austrian view does present a puzzle when applied
to  financial  markets.  It  is  a  simple  implication  of  the  ergodic  theorem  that
stationarity enables one to consistently estimate all patterns in the data. This means
that investors could uncover all inefficiencies, and exploit them, only to eventually
lead the market towards an efficient equilibrium, something that Neo-Austrians
claim will never be attained.Emerging from the Shadows
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This puzzle is all the more forceful if one appreciates Neo-Austrians’ insistence
that  the  failure  of  markets  to  reach  the  classical  equilibrium  ought  not  to  be
attributed to costs of any nature (adjustment costs, information costs, trading costs,
etc.). As mentioned before, the non-convergence has its origin in limitations of
knowledge, however vague this expression may seem. By this Neo-Austrians do
not mean that certain parameters of the price processes are unknown; stationarity
would contradict that.
We  propose  the  following  resolution  for  the  puzzle.  A  fully  rational,  risk-
averse  investor,  having  detected  evidence  against  market  efficiency,  will  not
exploit this if he fails to understand the nature of the inefficiencies. To determine
the latter, he wants reliable confidence statements about the inference he draws
from  the  data.  There  are  situations  where  these  statements  cannot  be  made,
namely, when the assumptions behind classical statistics are violated. To obtain
correct confidence intervals, more is needed than just stationarity. In other words,
the  return  process  may  still  lack  the  necessary  conditions  to  attach  precise
probabilities to statements about the true nature of the inefficiencies.
Despite the stability (stationarity), rational, risk-averse investors are unable to
exploit all inefficiencies because they cannot make reliable inferences. This would
be the case if the memory of the return process is sufficiently long for statistics not
to  display  their  usual  distributional  properties  needed  to  construct  confidence
intervals. In the JF paper we provide an example of an economy where this is the
case.
Faced with a situation where inference is unreliable from a classical point of
view (yet the market is clearly inefficient), our investor may as well use rules of
thumb to exploit the inefficiency. This situation is precisely the one that Neo-
Austrians specify as being typical of financial markets.
Our investor resorting to using rules of thumb corresponds to the Neo-Austrian
view that agents are not ignorant, but that they appreciate that knowledge cannot
be  perfect.  Successful trading  rules  may  be  myopic  and  simple,  and  could  be
devoid of comprehensive economic reasoning.
6 They are, however, examples of
reasonable reactions of a rational investor who realizes that inference may at times
be limited even if the return process is stationary.
                                                          
6 Charles Plott often likens traders to fish, which are generally extremely good swimmers without
knowing any hydrodynamics. In fact, fish are not even interested in hydrodynamics, just like
many traders often show a lack of interest in academc finance. We provide a foundation for this
attitude of indifference.Financial Regulation:
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Conclusion
Our analysis has implications beyond Neo-Austrian economics. It exemplifies how
classical inference can be unreliable when financial markets are inefficient. This
should  caution  empiricists  from  concluding  that  they  can  infer  the  nature  of
inefficiencies  once  they  have  found  that  they  exist.  Loosely  speaking,  if
inefficiencies  are  of  the  Neo-Austrian  kind,  not  much  can  be  said  beyond
admitting that inefficiencies exist. Market intervention that is based on potentially
erroneous  inference  is  certainly  ill  advised.  Friedrich  Hayek’s  distaste  for
government  intervention  in  market  forces  now  becomes  understandable.
Intervention  may  make  things  worse,  despite  the  apparent  inefficiencies  that
already exist.Emerging from the Shadows
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
At the end of this inaugural address I would like to thank all that have contributed
to  my  appointment  as  Full  Professor  of  “Institutional  Design  of  Integrating
Markets” at the Rotterdam School of Management / Faculteit Bedrijfskunde of
Erasmus University Rotterdam. Especially, I would like to thank the following
persons:
Distinguished Board of Erasmus University Rotterdam,
I am grateful for the confidence and opportunity you have given me at a relatively
young age to work as a professor at Erasmus University. I look forward to our
continued  co-operation,  also  with  respect  to  the  new  international  Bachelor  /
Machelor of Science in Business Administration.
Distinguished Professor Verhaegen, Dear Paul,
As Dean of the Rotterdam School of Management / Faculteit Bedrijfskunde you
play  an  inspiring  role  in  further  enhancing  the  international  reputation  of  the
business school. I look forward to a continuation of our intensive co-operation. At
the same time, I would like to thank you for the special role you have played in my
professional career: in 1989 you persuaded me to move from Tilburg University to
Maastricht University, while in 1999 you considered it time to make another move
to Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Distinguished Professor Sijben, Dear Jacques,
In September 1983 we met for the first time when I was a second-year student at
Tilburg University, attending your lectures in monetary economics. I am rather
confident  that  your  enthusiasm  has  inspired  me  to  specialize  in  the  fields  of
monetary economics and finance. I am also grateful for the role you have played
as one of the two supervisors of my Ph.D. thesis.
Distinguished Professor Wolff, Dear Christian,
During  the  period  of  10  years  that  I  worked  at  Maastricht  University,  we
developed  a  strong  and  personal  relationship.  Although  we  have  now  gone
different ways, I would like to thank you for these years of intense cooperation. I
am also grateful for the support you provided as supervisor of my Ph.D. thesis.Financial Regulation:
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Distinguished Professor Koedijk, Dear Kees,
Both  in  Maastricht  and  Rotterdam  we  have  been  working  together  on  various
projects. I am grateful for the support you have given me and look forward to our
future co-operation.
Distinguished Professor Kaufman, Dear George,
I am grateful for the confidence you have given me during the past decade. In the
early 1990s, when I was still a Ph.D. student, I visited you in Chicago. Since then,
we have been working together on several projects. I recollect with pleasure the
conference on financial fragility we organized in Maastricht in 1994. I also recall
that you stimulated me to set up a Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee in
Europe.
Distinguished  Colleagues  at  the  Rotterdam  Schools  of  Management  and
Economics,
During the past 18 months I have been working with many of you in order to build
up the new international program Business Administration. I look forward to our
continued co-operation and to a further integration of both schools.
Distinguished Students Business Administration,
Last September, about 200 of you, coming from 43 countries, started as students
Business Administration. I look forward to our joint efforts to make the program
even more international.
Dear Parents,
I am very grateful for the support that both of you have always given me. I am also
very proud that, at a age of around 75, both of you can be here today.
Ik heb gezegd,
Thank you very much.17
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